Productivity has become a kind of buzzword in science studies. Whether you look at the literature on research management, the economic literature on technology and innovation, the literature on bibliometrics or the official literature on science policy and its conceptual frameworks, what you find is analyses on productivity, often accompanied by a plea and recipes for increased productivity. This paper documents how the concept of productivity got into the analysis of science, through the statistics on which the concept rested, and its transformation over one hundred years. It argues that, through history, the concept as applied to science carried four meanings: productivity as reproduction, productivity as output, productivity as efficiency, and productivity as outcome.
Introduction
Productivity has become a kind of buzzword in science studies. Whether you look at the literature on research management, the economic literature on technology and innovation, or the literature on bibliometrics, what you find is analyses on productivity, often accompanied by a plea and recipes for increased productivity. Policy documents and frameworks share the same "bias". Since the early 1990s and the OECD's program on technology and the economy, the organization's literature on science and innovation policy carries productivity as main objective and yardstick.
1 Similarly, the current European Union's innovation strategy, as well as the European Commission literature on the knowledge-based economy, is totally linked to a rhetoric on gaps in productivity between European countries and the United States.
2
What is more surprising than the mere quantity of the literature on productivity is to find fields that are not necessarily "economics-oriented" and that are wholly devoted to studying "pure" academic activities (publications) to be concerned largely with the issue of productivity. Bibliometric studies are mostly devoted to analyzing researchers' scientific productivity, ranking universities in terms of scientific productivity and analyzing factors such as the size of groups and institutions and the role of size on scientific productivity.
What this whole literature shares, beyond the idea of productivity, is statistics. In fact, today one would not imagine a discussion on productivity that does not rely on statistics 1 OECD (1992) to measure the concept. The concept of productivity, central to classical economics since its very beginning, came to be defined entirely by way of statistics from the 19 th Century.
What the concept really means for scientific activities, and how it got into analyses of science itself, is probably unknown to most of us. How did an activity such as science, long reputed to be not analyzable in "economic" terms, come to be extensively studied in terms of productivity?
This paper documents the emergence of the concept of productivity, as applied to science, through the statistics on which it was based, and its transformation over one hundred years. It argues that the concept came from (social) scientists and their efforts at promoting the progress of civilization and the advancement of science. With time, the concept of productivity moved from a conception centered on the science system itself, or the reproduction of men of science and their outputs, to a conception where economic considerations external to the system took preeminence. This occurred in four steps, and the social context was responsible for the use and transformation of the concept.
The first part documents the very first use of the concept as applied to science. It comes from the British scientist Francis Galton (1822 Galton ( -1911 and his eugenics program:
improving the race in the name of civilization. To Galton, men of science were part of the group of eminent men on which civilization rested, and every effort should be devoted to increase the fertility of families of men of science. Productivity as reproduction, or perpetuation of the stock, as I name this first use, guided the very first systematic efforts at measuring science. The American James McKeen Cattell (1860 -1944 , pioneer of scientometrics, devoted over thirty years of his life to the advancement of science by collecting statistics and measuring the productivity of nations in terms of men of science.
In these efforts, Cattell, as a psychologist, was seconded by his peers. In order to contribute to the advancement of psychology as a science, psychologists made the first systematic use of counting scientific papers in history, doing so from 1903 onward. The statistics served the rhetoric on scientific progress or productivity in psychology:
measuring what was produced. It gave birth to a new field, bibliometrics. The second part of this paper is concerned with documenting this second use of the term: productivity as production of a "good" (publications), or output.
In the 1940s and 1950s, new kinds of "statisticians" appeared. Scientists now shared their efforts at constructing statistics on science with officials: government departments and national bureaus of statistics. The focus and the measurements were no longer on men of science and their scientific activities. Officials were rather interested in what they got out of money invested in science (value for money). They therefore multiplied the statistics available, and integrated them into a framework linking what was called inputs to outputs. The third part documents the emergence of this accounting framework as the emblem of a conception of scientific productivity centered on productivity as efficiency.
The last part looks at the shift from issues and statistics regarding scientific productivity per se, or productivity in science or the science system, to the impact of science on economic productivity. This meaning I call productivity as outcome. Science was now solicited for contributing to economic growth and productivity. This focus on productivity as outcome comes from economics and its earliest efforts at integrating science into the economic equation via a model called the production function.
Productivity as Reproduction
Statistics on science emerged in the nineteenth century in a context where issues about the decline of the race and of civilization were being widely discussed: great men were not reproducing enough. 3 Many authors devoted themselves to the study of genius and its sources (heredity or environment), because of the contribution of genius to "civilization". Also, many believed that the stock and, above all, the quality of populations was declining because the "unfit" were reproducing at a greater rate than the 3 D. J. Kevles (1985) could raise the average standard of our race only one grade", suggested Galton, "what vast changes would be produced! The number of men of natural gifts equal to those of eminent men of the present day, would be necessarily increased more than tenfold" (p.
398).
Galton was the first to quantify the "decline" in civilization. In Hereditary Genius (1869), he looked at family histories of judges, statesmen, commanders, literary men, men of science, poets, musicians, painters and divines. From biographical dictionaries, he chose 300 families containing nearly 1,000 eminent men (977), of whom 415 were illustrious.
Galton found that eminent men came generally from eminent families, but he estimated that Great Britain did not produce enough of these men. He arrived at this result by developing a scale of ability (or intelligence) based on statistical laws, and estimating the distribution of intelligence in the population. To Galton, there were only 233 British eminent men for every one million population, while "if we could raise the average standard of our race one grade" there would be 2,423 of them (p. 398). Similarly for higher degrees of intelligence: "All England contains only six men between the age of thirty and eighty, whose natural gifts exceed class G; but in a country of the same population as ours, whose average was one grade higher, there would be eighty-two of such men; and in another whose average was two grades higher no less than 1,355 of them would be found" (p. 399). Briefly stated, fertility, or what Galton called the "productiveness" (p. 36) of eminent families, was too low.
To Galton, men of science were part of the group of highly intelligent people he valued so much for the progress of civilization. He studied this group on three occasions. In
Hereditary Genius, Galton had calculated that the chance of kinsmen of illustrious men rising or having risen to eminence is, on average, 1 out of 6. Regarding men of science specifically, he found that one-half have one or more eminent relations: "to every 10 illustrious men, who have any eminent relations at all, we find 3 or 4 eminent fathers, 4
or 5 eminent brothers, and 5 or 6 eminent sons" (p. 378). Men of science were thus exceptionally productive of eminent sons.
A few years later, in English Men of Science (1874), Galton deplored the fact that the social conditions did not allow men of science to reproduce. He sent a questionnaire to 180 British men of science and questioned its respondents on four aspects, among them their antecedents. Using one hundred returned questionnaires, Galton measured that men of science had less children than their parents, a "tendency to an extinction of the families of men who work hard with the brain" (p. 37), "a danger to the continuance of the race" (p. 38). To Galton, "science has hitherto been at a disadvantage, compared with other competing pursuits, in enlisting the attention of the best intellects of the nation, for reasons that are partly inherent and partly artificial" (p. 258). There is a "tendency to abandon the colder attractions of science for those of political and social life (…). Those who select some branch of science as a profession, must do so in spite of the fact that it is less remunerative than any other pursuit" (p. 258-9). To Galton, "the possession of a strong special taste [for science] is a precious capital, and that it is a wicked waste of national power to thwart it ruthlessly by a false system of education " (p. 196 In the case of science, for example, productivity meant the number of men of science a nation produces: "the different nations vary at the different epochs in their scientific productiveness". 13 The third characteristic of the concept is allowing comparisons. The numbers were generally computed in order to compare groups, social classes or nations.
The general idea behind the concept is that of the ability of a race, particularly its members of a higher type, to reproduce itself in sufficient numbers to maintain or increase culture or civilization: "the possibility of improving the race of a nation depends on the power of increasing the productivity of the best stock". Candolle used terms like "répartition" and "proportion" (share) rather than productivity or productiveness, but the idea of a ratio to the total population and quantitative comparisons between countries was fundamental to his results. 17 He found that small countries, above all Switzerland, were first in terms of foreign members in scientific societies over the entire period he studied. Genius, Galton confined his analysis to the proportion of men who were over 50 years of age because a "man must outlive the age of fifty to be sure of being widely appreciated" (p. 51). This definition allowed him to exclude notoriety by a single act, and to focus on a man who maintains his position in time or "has distinguished himself pretty frequently either by purely original work, or as a leader of opinion" (p. 51).
Galton gave rise to a whole literature concerned with measuring men of genius and the role of eminent men in civilization, 19 then intelligence, or IQ. Above all, the concept of productivity and the statistical comparisons it allowed gained widespread acceptance in science. The first user was James McKeen Cattell, student of Galton and pioneer of scientometrics. In 1906, Cattell, an American psychologist (at Columbia University) and editor of Science for fifty years , published the first edition of his directory of scientists entitled American Men of Science. 20 The directory contained biographical information on thousands of men of science in the United States: name with title and university, department, place and date of birth, education and degrees, positions, honorary degrees and other scientific honors, membership in scientific and learned societies, subjects of research. This first edition contained 4,000 biographical sketches, restricted to those men "who have carried on research work" and "contributed to the advancement of pure science" (natural science). Cattell envisaged two uses for the directory. 21 The first was to study the productivity of men of science in the country (quantity) and their performance (quality). The second motive examines "the old question of the relative contribution of heredity and environment".
As with Galton, Cattell was preoccupied with the state of civilization. To Cattell, "the progress to our present civilization may have depended largely on the comparatively few men who have guided it, and the civilization we hope to have may depend on a few men (…). If we can improve the stock by eliminating the unfit or by favoring the endowed -if we give to those who have and take away from those who have not even that which they have -we can greatly accelerate and direct the course of evolution. If the total population, especially of the well endowed, is larger, we increase the number of great men" (p. 377). 22 To Cattell, the future progress of civilization depended entirely on science: "the entire development of our civilization is due to the applications of science" (p. 568), 23 he stated. "The rewards of science are queerly out of proportion to what science has accomplished for human welfare" (p. 569).
Cattell's statistics were entirely developed for contributing to the advancement of science. At the beginning of the twentieth century, science in the United States was perceived as lagging Europe in terms of basic research and opportunities. 24 Direct funding of men of science, by way of privately funded philanthropy, was just beginning;
industrial laboratories that could hire or consult men of science were few; there was little government support for university research. Men of science often analyzed these trends in terms of a teaching/research dichotomy: men engaged in research "do not on the average devote more than half their time to it", estimated Cattell. 25 Generally speaking, "a man must be regarded as an amateur in work to which he does not devote more than half his time". 26 To Cattell, men of science had no real opportunities that would allow them to devote their time to research and contribute to scientific productivity. "It seems to me", said Cattell, "that scientific men suffer in character because they are employees rather than free men. We are not permitted to follow our chosen leaders, but men are placed in authority over us. We are paid to teach or the like; our scientific work must be done almost clandestinely (…)". 27 To Cattell, these conditions were detrimental to scientific productivity. The advancement of science…and of the scientific profession therefore became Cattell's leitmotif, and statistics his precious tool to this end: "It is surely time for scientific men to apply scientific method [statistics] to determine the circumstances that promote or hinder the advancement of science" (p. 634). 28 Cattell produced the world's first systematic series of statistics on scientific productivity in science. He published regular statistical analyses for thirty years on the demography, The second edition of the directory (1910) allowed Cattell to develop statistical comparisons over time. 32 Cattell reiterated the fact that "we are at present almost wantonly ignorant and careless in regard to the conditions which favor or hinder scientific work. We do not know whether progress is in the main due to a large number of faithful workers or to the genius of a few. We do not know to what extent it may be possible to advance science by increasing the number of scientific positions or how far such an increase might be expected to add to the number of men of genius." (p. 634).
Cattell's new statistical analysis was entirely placed under an evaluative or moral tone, using terms like gain or loss, success or failure, leadership, deficiency in productivity, progressive centers, sinister and discreditable records. Cattell measured that the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut showed the greatest gains -nearly one-fourth of new men of science reside in these two states, which have just 5% of the US population (p. 641) -that the western states have about maintained their position, while the southern states fell still further behind and big cities were losing to an extent that is "ominous" (p. 640). In general, "the increase in the number of scientific men of standing is only about one-half so large as the increase in the population of the country (...). In no country does there seem to be a group of younger men of genius, ready to fill the places of the great men of the last generation" (p. 645).
This conclusion would be "confirmed" a few years later. Following in Galton's footsteps, Cattell conducted a survey on families of men of science, and published the results in 1915-1917. 33 He analyzed the nationality and race of men of science's parents, their occupations, age at marriage and size of family, and arrived at the following result: "The families from which our scientific men come had on average 4.7 children, and those scientific men who are married and whose families are complete have on average 2.3 children" (p. 793). 34 Echoing Galton, Cattell concluded: "It is obvious that the families are not self-perpetuating (…). If the families of the scientific men should increase at the rate of the general population [which they don't], the thousand leading scientific men would have some 6,000 grandchildren instead of fewer than 2,000. These well-endowed and well-placed people would probably have an average economic worth through their performance of not less than $100,000, and the money loss due to their non-existence is thus $400,000,000" (p. 797). To Cattell, society thus has obligations with regard to children of professors. He suggested that universities give scholarships to the sons of men of science, and pay a higher salary to the married professor. This was his suggestion for the reproduction of the "species".
Measuring productivity by the number of men of science, as conceived by 
Productivity as Output
At the same time as Cattell's very first statistical studies appeared, the meaning of scientific productivity began to change. Already in Cattell's writings, one sees uses of the term in the sense of "output": "The scientific work accomplished in this country is not commensurate with its population and its wealth", claimed Cattell in 1909 (p. 228) . 39 Cattell was thinking here of work published, or "productiveness in publication", 40 Statistics on the profession was an integral part of the strategy to make psychology a science. Quantitative evidence was presented on all aspects of the discipline and its institutionalization. Several psychologists developed a rhetoric on progress in psychology in which measures of growth were constructed on psychologists (number, geographical distribution, per million population, status, degrees), departments, curriculums, student enrollment and doctorates conferred, laboratories, activities of the (American Psychological) Association, journals and … publications. Two vehicles carried these numbers. The first was periodic reviews. Some of these were strictly qualitative, but several others included quantitative material. The reviews appeared occasionally, but others were produced more systematically, being part of annual or decennial series. The second vehicle for assessing the progress made in psychology was histories of the Association.
In the course of these efforts, psychologists pioneered the systematic use of bibliometrics (counting papers). This development proceeded in two steps. The first was, to quote one of its very early users, "to take stock of progress" in psychology. 43 Here, productivity was simply the count of papers coming out of a group of researchers. From these regular analyses, Fernberger produced two papers on the "political economy"
of research, one of them published in Science, looking at the effects of world wars, politics and nationalism (publishing in one's own language) on scientific productivity.
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"It seems of interest to consider certain aspects of these curves as correlated with coincident political and economic events" (p. 84), suggested Fernberger. 49 He discussed how the war, coupled with politics (Nazism, Fascism) and the economic crisis, produced a decrease in the number of publications, but also how other factors like nationalism or the increase in nationalistic sentiment of nations led to an increase in other countries (Italy, Russia, small countries).
The second use psychologists made of bibliometrics was to see "whether or not advance has been satisfactory". 50 Here, a major change occurred. Productivity was no longer measured as a brute quantity of output (N) but defined as a ratio: N/Researchers. We owe this innovation to S. I. Franz, professor at George Washington University (1906 University ( -1921 , and scientific director (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) and then director (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) Franz checked whether this was true for contributions which are intended to convey new facts or new interpretations (articles and monographs), and found the same.
All the tendencies Franz observed were verified according to age. Franz distinguished two groups of authors: young and old men, defined again by the year in which they were granted their doctorate (before or after 1906). He measured that older men were more productive than younger ones, but that the ratio of actual to expected publications was higher among the younger ones. The same pattern appeared when he constructed a combined index of publications by assigning "arbitrary" values to the six types of contributions to translate the "heterogeneity of the different kinds of publications into a homogeneity". The distribution of the oldest men was more skewed than that for younger men.
To Franz, "it should not be assumed (…) that these men are doing nothing for psychological advance. Some may have editorial duties, some may conceal themselves in the work of their students, and some (like Herbert Spencer) may be reserving their energies for some magna opera which will be given to the world in due time. It seems unlikely, however, that as many as 40% of the older group are engaged in the accumulation of material for the development of a cosmology, or of a system of psychology, or of an exhaustive history of the science, or of other large projects which
should not be laid aside in favor of the minor contributions such as articles and monographs" (p. 215). "The writer feels that some of the so-called "professional"
psychologists should be classed with dilettantes" (p. 216). In conclusion "the attention of the reader is called to the consideration of the wisdom of the action of certain scientific societies which require that a member shall retain membership in them only as long as he continues to show an active interest in the advancement of his science by publication (…)" (p. 219).
Fernberger would continue such analyses of scientific productivity in the 1930s, looking at productivity differences between men and women, academics and non-academics, and documenting the skewed distribution of scientific productivity. 53 By that time,
Fernberger was only one of several to use papers as output for measuring scientific productivity, or simply science. Scientific papers were also used as indicator of civilization, for "literature furnishes us with the best mirror of the human mind". 54 In the hands of some psychologists, scientific productivity came to mean creativity, and was measured either by surveying the attitudes of scientists, 55 or counting the age at which scientists publish most and publish their best work, 56 an idea first introduced in the context of studies on genius. productivity or on growth of scientific literature. 62 Bibliometrics also came to be used as a tool for managing science and increasing scientific productivity in organizations, 63 and as an indicator of scientific activities in national statistical offices. 64 Counting scientific papers was only one of the measurements of output that emerged in the early twentieth century. A second measurement was counting inventions. The measurement of invention as an output to science, or research, we owe mainly to the voluminous information from the Patent Offices, particularly in the United States. 65 Again, the motive behind the very early uses was understanding genius 66 and measuring culture or civilization -or national inventiveness. 67 However, the statistics soon came to serve other theoretical purposes, like understanding growth 68 (and decline) 69 in technology and technology's role in industrial development, and contributing to the sociology of science 70 and the study of productivity of inventors. 71 In the 1960-70s, counting inventions, their origin and diffusion became the favorite measure of innovation, 72 before statisticians turned to defining innovation as activity rather than output. 73 By the end of the 1950s, everything was in place for the "modern" conception of productivity to be applied to science: a ratio of input (men of science) to output (publications, inventions).
Productivity as Efficiency
By the 1920s, academics were no longer alone in conducting research. Firms as well as government departments were increasingly involved in research, and statistics came to be collected on these organizations to document the fact. First, the US National Research
Council became the source of several statistics on science in the United States, continuing and extending the series published in Science by Cattell on graduates and grants for scientific research. 74 The council's most influential data, however, were on industrial laboratories. From 1920, the organization systematically collected information on firms conducting research and the number of industrial "men of science", or scientific and technical personnel. The lists of laboratories were used by many public organizations for conducting surveys, and the data for analyzing industrial research. What was most wanted, however, was information on money spent on research, more difficult to obtain from firms for confidentiality, accounting and methodological reasons. 75 This type of information came in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Following a pioneering National
Research Council study, 76 firms began to be surveyed on their expenditures on R&D by several industrial organizations, then government departments and statistical offices.
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At the same time, public institutions, above all those concerned with planning, 78 started compiling statistics on government activities with regard to both scientific and technical personnel and money devoted to research. 79 This series of measurements on public research was launched by E. B. Rosa, chief physicist at the US Bureau of Standards, who compiled, for the first time in American history, a government budget for "researcheducation-development" in 1920. 80 By the mid 1950s, in Anglo-Saxon countries at least, all sectors of the economy were systematically surveyed on their scientific and technical personnel and their expenditures on R&D: industry, government, university, and non-profit organizations. 81 The data gave rise to the concept of a national budget on science, first imagined by the British scientist
What soon came to characterize the statistics on science, no longer collected by scientists like Cattell but by statistical offices and government departments, was the framework into which they were developed and used: an accounting framework. The model used to collect and analyze the newly-conceived data on science was framed in terms of input and output, or efficiency ("getting value for money"). Inputs were defined as investments in the resources necessary to conduct scientific activities, like money and scientific and technical personnel, and outputs as what comes out of these activities: knowledge and inventions. A very simple framework defined the relationship between input and output as follows:
The first edition of the OECD Frascati manual (1962) set the stage for the input-output approach as a framework for statistics on science. 85 The manual was entirely concerned with proposing standards to official statisticians for the measurement of inputs. Despite this focus, the manual discussed output, and inserted a chapter (section) specifically dedicated to its measurement because "in order really to assess R&D efficiency, some measures of output should be found" (p. 11). From its very first edition, the Frascati manual suggested that a complete set of statistics and indicators, covering both input and output, was necessary to properly measure science. and remained a fervent advocate of the input-output framework for decades. 92 As consultant to various organizations, Freeman believed that "it is only by measuring innovations (…) that the efficiency of the [science] system (…) can be assessed" (p. 25). 93 "The output of all stages of R&D activity is a flow of information and the final output of the whole system is innovations -new products, processes and systems" (p. 27).
To Freeman, "the argument that the whole output of R&D is in principle not definable is unacceptable (…). If we cannot measure all of it because of a variety of practical difficulties, this does not mean that it may not be useful to measure part of it. The GNP does not measure the whole of the production activity of any country, largely because of the practical difficulties of measuring certain types of work. The measurement of R&D inputs omits important areas of research and inventive activity. But this does not mean than GNP or R&D input measures are useless" (pp. 10-11) . And what about the relationship between input and output? "The argument that the input/output relationship is too arbitrary and uncertain in R&D activity to justify any attempts to improve efficiency or effectiveness (…) rests largely on the view that unpredictable accidents are so characteristic of the process that rationality in management is impossible to attain (…).
The logical fallacy lies in assuming that, because accidental features are present in individual cases, it is therefore impossible to make useful statistical generalizations about a class of phenomena" (p. 11).
The historical source of the input/output framework is twofold. The first is management of industrial research and the control of costs. Establishing a relationship between input and output at the national level, that is the level that interests governments most, is in fact the analogue to the firms' ratio on "returns on investment" (ROI). For decades, managers have constructed such ratios in order to evaluate their investments. 94 Very early on, the ratios came to be applied to R&D activities. By the 1950s, most companies calculated ratios like R&D as a percentage of earnings, as a percentage of sales, or as a percentage of value-added, 95 and a whole "industry" developed around studying the "effectiveness" of research. 96 Very few administrative decisions really relied automatically on metrics, 97 but it was not long before the ratios came to be applied to aggregated statistics on industrial R&D 98 and national R&D expenditures. 99 In the latter case, GDP served as denominator and gave the famous GERD/GDP ratio as the objective of science policies.
Then economists came on the scene and developed methods for estimating social rates of return.
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The conferees discussed at length how to define and measure inputs and outputs, and what the relationship is between the two. Although some concluded for causality, like R. several indicators to measure science as a system, presented them in an input-output framework, and suggested all sorts of input-output ratios. 114 In the following decades, most researchers would use an input-output framework to conduct "accounting" or evaluation exercises of investments in science.
115

Productivity as Outcome
Productivity as efficiency ("getting value for money") emerged from considerations about the science system itself and its output: how the system performs, that is, do men of science produce the expected output of a scientific type? As the last section documented, the concept slowly drifted toward looking at output of a technological type. The next step was measuring productivity as outcome. In fact, the production function suggested economists and statisticians not only a framework for measuring the productivity of the science system itself, but also gave a tool for measuring the impact or outcome of the system on (economic) productivity.
Interests in measuring the impact of science, or technology, on economic productivity can be traced back to the years following the Great Depression, when the bicentennial debate on the role of mechanization on employment reemerged. 116 labor productivity as a ratio of "quantity output per employee man-year" would answer the question on technology and unemployment: "since the net effects of the underlying economic factors find their quantitative expression in the net changes of the volume of production and employment, a statistical analysis of the relationship between the total volume of goods and services produced in the country and the number of hired workers engaged in the production offers an approach toward a better understanding of the nature of a problem which has come to popularly as that of technological unemployment".
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To Weintraub, "the unit-labor-requirement ratio indicates changes in man-years employed per unit of total output" (p. 72). If the same number of workers or less is required to produce the same level of output or more, it means that technology causes increased productivity, and therefore unemployment. Indeed, Weintraub found a disparity between production and employment: "while production in 1935 was 14 percent above 1920, the productivity of hired workers was 39 percent higher or the unit labor requirement was 28 percent lower (…). While 146 units of the Nation's output were being produced in 1929 for every 100 in 1920, only 16 percent more man-years were employed in 1929" (pp. [71] [72] .
Weintraub admitted, however, that his ratio of labor productivity "cannot be interpreted as measures of the extent of technological advance" (p. 78). "To measure the full effect of even a single technological change on displacement or absorption would necessitate the virtually impossible task of tracing it through the innumerable factors which bear on the total volume of production and employment" (p. 80). "The effect of strictly technological change on employment in a single industry or even a single plant cannot be isolated (…). Over-all productivity ratios (…) reflect a variety of factors in addition to
One way to demonstrate this state of affairs was to estimate gaps in publications or scientific output between the United States and European countries. To psychologists, however, there was no such gap in their discipline. Psychological science was flourishing, and statistics on scientific papers served to document the case. In the next decades, the statistics became the main way of measuring scientists' output. For firms and governments, however, such arguments were not enough. Funding scientific research required that a firm earn profits, and funding scientific research from public money, that the system of science proves how it was efficient, and this places onus on technological output. To account for economic progress and "manage" the research system accordingly, a series of statistics were conceived built into an accounting framework. The hypothesis, or expectation, was that more money should lead to more output. The ultimate output, or outcome, was profits, economic growth and productivity.
Conceptions of Scientific Productivity
Actually, the field of science and technology studies, particularly the policy-oriented subfield, has fully endorsed the productivity issue rather than being critical. Every conceptual framework developed over the last fifty years is concerned with accounting and efficiency in the broadest sense. Whether one looks at the linear model of innovation, accounting exercises such as input-output analysis, the information economy or society, the national system of innovation, the knowledge-based economy, or the new economy, the most central issue and the statistics of the frameworks are economic, among which is the concept of productivity. Either one measures the productivity of the science system itself, or scientific productivity (academic papers), or the contribution of science to economic growth and productivity.
There are at least three reasons that explain this orientation in current frameworks. One is the basic unit of science policy and analyses. Whereas early studies of science, particularly sociological studies, were concerned with people and the varied impacts of science on people's lives, current studies focus entirely on organizations and their efficiency. Economic growth rather that quality of life drives policies. Second, and methodologically, economic outputs are easier to measure than the social and cultural aspects or impacts of science, for example. For this reason, many researchers use (economic) data sources that are easily available and standardized rather than develop specific surveys. Third, most studies are conducted by economists or, for purposes of "emulation", by researchers using an economic-type framework. These, then, are three factors that automatically suggest three loci for changing analytical frameworks: the policy issues, the data, and … the researchers.
As a contribution to the sociology of statistics, particularly on the relationships between concepts and statistics, the history of the concept of productivity as applied to science shows that concepts are flexible and malleable. First, they are flexible and malleable in their use. Individuals, groups and communities with totally different "ideologies" make use of the same concepts for their own ends. Throughout history, the concept of productivity was used as ideal (civilization), as rhetoric (advancement of science), and as rationale for policy (accounting) and action (economic growth). Second, concepts are flexible and malleable in their meaning: the sense of a concept is adapted to and influenced by the social context in which it emerges and flourishes. First used in a purely academic context, the concept of scientific productivity got into institutions and politics, owing to the demand of "organizations" for efficiency.
The history also shows how statistics helped give meaning to concepts. The concept of productivity we owe entirely to statistics: a ratio dividing two numbers. However, each use of the concept by a different group or in a different context carried specific or "appropriate" statistics that gave meaning to the motives of the actors: men of science in a race or population, activities of a group of researchers, and economic returns on monetary investments. Like concepts, statistics are not given, but flexible and malleable, according to the aim and program of its user.
